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China pe rspect i ves
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) governmentreleased the document “Methods for Selecting the Chief Executiveand for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012” (henceforward re-
ferred to as the “Political Reform Proposals”) in November 2009. It did not,
as demanded by the territory’s pro-democracy movement, provide a con-
crete timetable and roadmap for the election by universal suffrage of the
Chief Executive in 2017 and of all seats in the Legislative Council in 2020.
This was very disappointing from the movement’s perspective.
The contents of the Political Reform Proposals were nevertheless not at
all surprising. Rather, the divisions within the pro-democracy movement
overall suggest that a permanent split within the movement has become
inevitable. (1) Further, in the eyes of Hong Kong people, the Chinese leader-
ship and the HKSAR government are not interested in the promotion of
genuine democracy, and its implementation has now become uncertain.
A political movement that has been in opposition since its birth in the 1980s
and that has no prospect of securing political power has inevitably become di-
vided in strategy and tactics, with one segment acting in moderation and pur-
suing negotiations with the authorities, and another segment opting for radi-
calism. This split reflects increasing polarisation in Hong Kong society as well, as
the majority becomes more and more apathetic and a significant minority
demonstrates rising frustration and anger, not only over the stagnation in the
democratisation process, but also over the widening gap between rich and poor.
This article intends to examine the challenges facing the pro-democracy
movement in Hong Kong today, as well as the general political and social
situation in the territory. It argues that the deterioration and divisions
within the pro-democracy movement may not be political gains for the
pro-Beijing united front, as political and social polarisation poses serious
problems for effective governance as well. An administration threatened by
legitimacy deficit will encounter increasing difficulty in its provision of
economic development and social services, thus forcing itself into a vicious
circle as unsatisfactory performance further worsens its legitimacy deficit.
The progress or lack of progress in electoral
reforms
The attempt to introduce Article 23 legislation (2) and the difficult eco-
nomic situation caused by the Severe and Acute Respiratory Syndrome
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* Joseph Y.S. Cheng is Chair Professor of Political Science at the City University of Hong Kong (Email: rc-
ccrc@cityu.edu.hk), editor of The Journal of Comparative Asian Development and the Hong Kong Jour-
nal of Social Sciences (香港社會科學學報, xianggang shehui kexue xuebao). One of his last books is:
Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), Whither China’s Democracy? Democratization in China since the Tiananmen
Incident, Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2011.
1. See, for example, the column by Lee Sin-Chi entitled “Jianzhipai dali zaoshi, fanmin fenlie cheng
dingju,”(The establishment strenuously building a favourable environment, the pan-democratic camp
destined to split), Ming Pao, 21 December 2009, p. A4.
2. Article 23 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s constitution) states: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central
People’s Government, or theft of state secretes, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from con-
ducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region form
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” This article was written into the draft Basic
Law after the massive protest rallies in Hong Kong during the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; obviously, the Chi-
nese authorities were concerned about a repetition of such activities. The Tung administration was wise
enough not to initiate the controversial legislative process during his first term. In response to the open pro-
motion of the Chinese authorities, a paper addressing the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law
was finally unveiled for public consultation in September 2002. As expected, the proposals stirred fears of a
crackdown on human rights groups and Falun Gong. The territory’s pro-democracy camp also perceived the
proposals as a threat to civil liberties. See South China Morning Post, 25 September 2002.
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(SARS) epidemic prompted more than half a million people to take to the
streets in protests demanding democracy. (3) In response, the HKSAR gov-
ernment established the Constitutional Development Task Force in January
2004. It also decided to initiate the mechanism for amending the electoral
methods for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council in accordance
with the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) inter-
pretation of April 2004, in an attempt to strengthen the democratic ele-
ments of the Chief Executive election in 2007 and the Legislative Council
elections in 2008.
The HKSAR government in October 2005 announced a package of pro-
posals to reform the electoral systems starting in 2007/2008. The package
suggested including all District Council members in the Election Commit-
tee for the election of the Chief Executive, (4) and expanding the Legislative
Council from 60 to 70 members, with one additional seat for each of the
five geographical constituencies, and another five to be elected from
among the District Council members. Later in November 2005, the Chief
Executive also initiated discussions on the models, roadmap, and timetable
for implementing universal suffrage through the appointed Commission on
Strategic Development.
In the following month, pro-democracy legislators vetoed the electoral
reform package. They could not accept that both the central government
and the HKSAR government had refused to provide a concrete roadmap
and timetable for the implementation of universal suffrage for the election
of the Chief Executive and the entire legislature. They were also against the
retention of appointed and ex-officio members in the District Councils. 
The defeat of the HKSAR government’s electoral reform package meant
that the existing electoral methods would continue to apply. The pro-
democracy movement believed that Beijing and the HKSAR government
had no sincere intention to implement genuine democracy in Hong Kong,
while the pro-Beijing united front attacked the pro-democracy groups for
blocking progress in electoral reforms and delaying the democratisation on
process. Meanwhile, from the end of 2005 to mid-2007, the Commission
on Strategic Development continued its task. 
The HKSAR government released the Green Paper on Constitutional De-
velopment on 11 July 2007 to consult the public on the options, roadmap,
and timetable for implementing universal suffrage for the elections of the
Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. On 12 December 2007, Donald
Tsang submitted a report to the NPCSC. Meanwhile, opinion surveys in
Hong Kong in the past decade or so have consistently showed that around
60 percent of the population support the prompt implementation of uni-
versal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive and the entire leg-
islature (referred to as “dual universal suffrage”). The pro-democracy
groups that have been demanding immediate implementation of “dual
universal suffrage” also succeed in securing about 60 percent of the votes
in the direct elections to the Legislative Council (they won even more
votes in earlier elections). Hence, the Donald Tsang administration in its re-
port to the NPCSC acknowledged that more than half of the public sup-
ported the implementation of “dual universal suffrage” in 2012, although
it also pointed out that introducing universal suffrage to the Chief Execu-
tive election no later than 2017 would stand a better chance of accept-
ance by the majority of the Hong Kong community.
The NPCSC soon announced its “Decision on Issues Relating to the
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR and for Forming
the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relat-
ing to Universal Suffrage” on 29 December 2007. The decision stipulated:
“The election of the fifth Chief Executive of the HKSAR in the year 2017
may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the
Chief Executive is selected by universal suffrage, the election of the Leg-
islative Council of the HKSAR may be implemented by the method of
electing all the members by universal suffrage.”
The Donald Tsang administration and the pro-Beijing united front have
since been arguing that the timetable for implementation of “dual univer-
sal suffrage” has been set. But the pro-democracy movement is certainly
right in criticising this as far from a concrete timetable and firm commit-
ment; they argue that the decision of the NPCSC may be interpreted as
follows: “If the conditions are ripe, then the ‘dual universal suffrage’ may be
implemented by 2017 and 2020 (the date of the Legislative Council elec-
tions following the Chief Executive election in 2017); and if the conditions
are not yet mature, caution is advised and delay may be prudent.” 
Further, the nomination procedure of the Chief Executive election re-
mains controversial. According to Article 45 of the Basic Law, the “ultimate
aim is the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nom-
ination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance
with democratic procedures.” It is generally expected that the existing
Election Committee electing the Chief Executive will then serve as the
nominating committee; and according to Article 4 of Annex I to the Basic
Law: “Candidates for the office of the Chief Executive may be nominated
jointly by not less than 100 members of the Election Committee. Each
member may nominate only one candidate.” The Election Committee is
expected to have 1,200 members in 2012, with 300 members elected from
each of the following four sectors: industrial, commercial, and financial
sectors; the professions; labour, social services, religious, and other sectors;
members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based or-
ganisations, Hong Kong deputies to the NPC, and representatives of Hong
Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
Since the elections to the Election Committee are heavily biased in
favour of the establishment, the pro-democracy movement may not be
able to win enough seats in the nominating committee to nominate its
candidate; i.e., if the threshold for nomination is set too high, there will not
be genuine competition, and the people of Hong Kong can only elect
someone from a shortlist of candidates approved by the Chinese leader-
ship. 
Hong Kong people well remember that in the election of the Chief Exec-
utive in 2002, a change of procedures made the Election Committee’s
nomination of candidates an open process. As a result, more than 700
members nominated C. H. Tung, and there were not enough votes left to
nominate another candidate; Tung was elected for second term on an ipso
facto basis. Then, in the election of the third term Chief Executive in June
2005, the pro-democracy movement candidate, Democratic Party chair-
man Lee Wing-tat, could not even secure the 100 votes necessary to qual-
ify as an official candidate. In the fourth term Chief Executive election in
2007, the pro-democracy movement candidate, Alan Leong Kah-kit, man-
aged to qualify as an official candidate and engage in debates with Donald
Tsang, who was seeking re-election. But the pro-democracy movement
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3. See Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally – Interpreting a Historic Event, Hong Kong, City
University of Hong Kong Press, 2005.
4. At that time, Hong Kong was divided into 18 districts, with District Councils serving as local advisory
bodies. There were about 400 members elected by small single-member constituencies, and more than
100 appointed members and ex-officio members who were chairmen of Rural Committees.
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only secured between 130 and 140 seats in the Election Committee, and
it would have been extremely difficult for it to do better.
Proposals from pro-Beijing united front figures, including members of the
Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR under the NPCSC, have
alarmed the pro-democracy movement. These suggestions use the pre-
texts of orderly competition and ensuring the broad representativeness of
the candidates to block the presentation of a candidate from the pro-
democracy movement. Most of these proposals aimed to raise the nomi-
nation threshold; for example, nomination should require the endorsement
of 200 (25 percent) instead of 100 members of the nomination commit-
tee, nomination should require the endorsement of a specific number of
representatives from each the four sectors, and nomination should require
the support of a number of Hong Kong deputies to the NPC. In response
to these proposals, the pro-democracy movement has demanded that the
nomination threshold for candidates in the Chief Executive election should
be no higher than the existing one.
Regarding the elections in 2012, the NPCSC decision in December 2007
stipulates that universal suffrage would as before apply to only half of the
seats of the legislature. Further, half of the seats would still be returned by
functional constituencies, and the procedures for voting on bills and mo-
tions in the Legislative Council would also remain unchanged. The latter
actually means that the majority of functional constituency seats would
retain veto power over initiatives by pro-democracy legislators. 
In the eyes of the Hong Kong community, if the scope of electoral re-
forms is so limited for the elections in 2012, how can one expect signifi-
cant progress in the years after 2012 and before 2017 and 2022? There are
suspicions that the Chinese authorities have been adopting delay tactics,
postponing the crucial issues of electoral reform until 2015 or 2016. Vari-
ous statements made by key establishment figures soon after the release
of the Political Reform Proposals have raised strong doubts as to whether
the Chinese authorities are really determined to abolish functional con-
stituencies by 2020. On 20 November 2009, Maria Tam, a Hong Kong
deputy to the NPC and a member of the Committee for the Basic Law of
the HKSAR under the NPCSC, indicated to the media that if the Legislative
Council seats returned by functional constituencies conform to the princi-
ple of equality, they would qualify as election by universal suffrage; she fur-
ther stated that universal suffrage would be defined by the central govern-
ment in Beijing according to the Basic Law, and not in line with the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (5) A day earlier, Chief Sec-
retary Henry Tang Ying-yen (a leading contender for the Chief Executive
post in 2012) declared that a system of “one man, two votes” would still
be “fair and equal” if everyone had a chance to vote in the functional con-
stituencies. (6) Hence, the abolition of functional constituencies has be-
come the most important theme in the present campaign for genuine
democracy.
In the electoral reform process in recent years, the autonomy of the
HKSAR government appears to have been eroding. During Donald Tsang’s
campaign for re-election as Chief Executive in early 2007, he told journal-
ists that he would “engage in a tough game” to settle the challenging issue
of political reform. In his first policy address after re-election, he stressed
that he had a constitutional duty to resolve the question of political re-
form in the territory. After the release of the Political Reform Proposals in
late 2009, however, both central government officials and the Tsang ad-
ministration indicated that Hong Kong did not have the authority to tackle
political development beyond 2012 in the political reform package. So,
when did the Donald Tsang administration lose the authority to handle po-
litical reform beyond 2012? When did the central government take back
this authority from the HKSAR government? Both the central government
and the HKSAR government still owe Hong Kong people an explanation. 
When Hong Kong people study the Basic Law, their understanding has al-
ways been that amendments to the method for selecting the Chief Exec-
utive after 2007 require the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the
full legislative Council, the consent of the Chief Executive, and the approval
of the NPCSC.
Similarly, amendments to the method for forming the Legislative council
can be made only with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the
full Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive; and it has
to be reported to the NPCSC for record.
There are no stipulations in the Basic Law that the HKSAR government
must seek the authorisation of the NPCSC before it can tackle the
roadmap and timetable for political reforms beyond the present term.
During the drafting of the Basic Law, Hong Kong people were not aware
that there had been such discussions on the prerequisite of NPCSC autho-
risation. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the HKSAR government must seek
the NPSCS’s authorisation before it seeks to abolish functional constituen-
cies in the Legislative Council by 2020.
Maria Tam’s statement on universal suffrage in Hong Kong also raises se-
rious questions. Was the HKSAR government consulted on this? If so, why
didn’t the Donald Tsang administration consult the Hong Kong community,
or at least inform it of the “new policy”? It is certainly inappropriate to
have such a significant decision revealed to the Hong Kong people during
a television talk-show. 
There were rumours within local media circles in mid-2010 that some
pro-Beijing legal experts in Hong Kong were working to produce a defini-
tion of “universal and equal representation” applicable to the territory’s fu-
ture political reform packages. There was no indication whether the Donald
Tsang administration was involved in this work.
After meeting the democratic Party delegation on the political reform
issue, Li Gang, deputy Director of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong,
was at pains to explain to the media that his office was not a “second gov-
erning team” in the territory. (7) This was actually the first local press con-
ference by the leadership of the Central Liaison Office; why should Li Gang
consider the issue of the “second governing team” something to be clari-
fied in this first press conference, when no reporter raised the issue? Cer-
tainly he realised that many Hong Kong people had this perception; and it
was more than the “personal comment” made by his former colleague Cao
Erbao in an article published in the Study Times of the Central Party School
in Beijing. (8)
When the central government authorised the Central Liaison Office to
meet with the pro-democracy group in Hong Kong, it should have carefully
considered whether these groups should assume the role of receiving mes-
sages from the entire Hong Kong community and serving as a bridge be-
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5. Ming Pao, 21 November 2009.
6. South China Morning Post, 20 November 2009.
7. Ming Pao, 24 May 2010.
8. Cao Erbao, “‘Yiguoliangzhi’ tiaojianxia Xiang Gang de guanzhi liliang” (The governance force of Hong
Kong under the conditions of “one country two systems” ), Xuexi shibao (Study Times), 29 January
2008. Cao Erbao was a department head of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong. He argued in his
article that mainland cadres involved in Hong Kong work could serve as a force for the governance of
Hong Kong. When the Hong Kong community later learnt about the article, a controversy arose and
generated considerable suspicion against Beijing’s intervention in the territory. 
Article
tween Beijing and Hong Kong on the issue of political reform. If this was
indeed the case, then it should have observed the principles of openness
and high transparency instead of selectively meeting some pro-democracy
groups based on united front considerations. 
Beijing’s strong influence
Hong Kong people understand that the issue of electoral reform will be
determined in Beijing and not by the HKSAR government. Symbolically,
the protest rally for democracy held on 1 January 2010 abandoned the
usual route and chose the Central Liaison Office, the representative of the
central government in Hong Kong, as its destination. It is expected that
more pro-democracy protest rallies will target the Central Liaison Office in
the future. (9)
The community also realises that the Chinese leadership is reluctant to
grant genuine democracy to the territory. Although a significant majority
of Hong Kong people is in support of democracy, it is unwilling to confront
Beijing. In view of the hard-line position, most Hong Kong people tend to
return to their traditional apathy. After all, the community is basically sat-
isfied with the status quo of stability and prosperity and is reluctant to
sacrifice it in the pursuit of democracy.
When President Hu Jintao visited Macau in December 2009, he openly
stated that the central government gave “a high rating” to the work of the
outgoing Edmund Ho Hau-wah administration and its contribution to
Macau and the nation. (10) When Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Donald
Tsang Yam-kuen, made his duty visit to Beijing at the end of the month, he
was told by Premier Wen Jiabao to resolve “some deep-rooted conflicts” in
Hong Kong society and was asked by President Hu to handle the territory’s
constitutional reforms “in an appropriate manner.” (11) Premier Wen’s re-
marks were broadly viewed as a public rebuke. Apparently the central lead-
ership is happy with the situation in Macau and dissatisfied with the polit-
ical and social contradictions in Hong Kong.
What, then, is the political situation in Macau? There was only one can-
didate, Fernando Chui Sai-on, in the 2009 Chief Executive election, and
therefore no competition and no public debate. Once Beijing indicated
that it had a preferred candidate, the issue was settled. Much more shock-
ing was the earlier election of the Election Committee – there were only
300 candidates to fill the same number of seats, hence no competition, no
campaigning, and no formal election.
The so-called Macau Street political culture is often described as follows:
Macau is a small place, and nearly all community leaders of any standing
are related to one another in some way. Electoral competition and contro-
versy are to be avoided for the sake of future co-operation and maintain-
ing harmony within the community. Organisations outside the establish-
ment have secured only three seats in the legislature, and there is a limit
to their political participation and mobilisation.
The domination of the establishment and the lack of a developed civil
society can be attributed to two factors. First, the local mass media are al-
most totally controlled by the establishment. Macau’s media do not criti-
cise its government or the Chinese government. Macau people have ample
access to Hong Kong newspapers, radio, and television – none of which
carry much news about Macau. The only independent media to be found
are in the Portuguese or English languages, serving the relatively small ex-
patriate community. Second, almost every recognised civic group in Macau
receives generous financial support from the government, which in turn
has been enjoying ample revenue from the casino industry in recent years.
Even the powerful Catholic Church has to maintain good relations with the
government in order to maintain its impressive social services. The only
outlets for social grievances are occasional protest rallies, such as on May
Day, which are usually confined to livelihood issues.
Hong Kong is still quite different. All parties concerned appreciate that
rule of law and freedom of information are essential to the territory’s func-
tioning as an international financial and business services centre. If these
two assets are severely eroded, Hong Kong will become just another Chi-
nese city with no edge over Shanghai and other coastal cities. But the les-
son of Macau is clear: unless Hong Kong people work hard to protect their
rights, civil society can degenerate. Some of the hallmarks of Macau poli-
tics are beginning to emerge in Hong Kong. Self-censorship in the media is
becoming increasingly serious; rational, in-depth discussion of political is-
sues is becoming much less frequent. The public is becoming more apa-
thetic politically, expressing their grievances mainly through protest ac-
tions to make headlines. 
In the long-term, Hong Kong people realise that the territory’s economy
is increasingly dependent on that of the mainland (see Table 1). This rising
dependence has been accompanied by a relative decline in Hong Kong’s
international economic competitiveness. Over the past decade, the leaders
of Shanghai have no longer looked to the territory as a model for emula-
tion; they have turned their eyes to New York and London. At the time of
Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the Guangdong authorities were
eager to establish closer economic ties with the HKSAR, but Hong Kong’s
top civil servants wanted to avoid a high degree of economic integration
with the mainland and were cool to Guangdong’s overtures. In recent
years, Guangdong has been following in the footsteps of Shanghai, trying
to attract investment from multinational corporations listed in the Fortune
500. The value of Hong Kong as an economic partner has thus been falling.
In sum, dependence on the mainland and the decline in relative bargaining
power has exacerbated Hong Kong people’s willingness to accept Beijing’s
position on the territory’s electoral reforms. 
At the same time, Hong Kong people’s confidence in China’s future con-
tinues to strengthen (Table 2). Apparently this is related to their increas-
ingly positive perception of mainland China’s international standing. A
public opinion survey conducted by the New Youth Forum in March 2009
revealed that 86 percent of the respondents thought that China had con-
siderable international influence; about 77 percent believed that China
would definitely or possibly overtake the US as a world superpower within
50 years; 80 percent felt that China was a peace-loving country; and 60
percent believed that China’s development would not threaten the Asia-
Pacific region. (12) The successful Beijing Olympics certainly helped; and
most Hong Kong people believed that China, in contrast to the US,
emerged from the recent global financial tsunami with its international
status improved.
The recent economic difficulties and political controversies have never-
theless undermined the Hong Kong community’s trust in the central gov-
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9. Protest rallies organised by the pro-democracy movement usually start from Victoria Park in Causeway
Bay and end at the government offices in Central. On 1 January 2010, the protest rally began in Central
and ended at the Central Liaison Office in Sai Wan. See all major newspapers in Hong Kong on 2 Jan-
uary 2010.
10. South China Morning Post, 20 December 2009.
11. Ibid., 29 December 2009.
12. Ibid., 30 March 2009.
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ernment and its confidence in “one country, two systems” (see Table 2). Given
that the territory’s economy is heavily dependent on the mainland economy
and the central government’s policy support, and that the HKSAR govern-
ment was chosen by China’s leaders, Hong Kong people might have held the
central government responsible for the performance of their economy and
government. But obviously the trends have been positive since 1997. 
In recent years, Hong Kong people’s trust in the central government has
been considerably higher than its trust in the Hong Kong government, in
contrast to the situation in the 1990s before the return of the territory to
China. In a survey in December 2008 (one of the series recorded in Table 2),
56 percent of the respondents said they trusted the central government.
By comparison, 42 percent of the respondents indicated that they trusted
the HKSAR government, and 19 percent indicate that they distrusted it.
The 14 percent gap between those who trusted the central government
and those who trusted the HKSAR government was the greatest since the
end of 2003. (13)
In early 1996, an opinion poll conducted by the Chinese University of
Hong Kong revealed that 42 percent of the respondents trusted the British
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1978 1.35 (-) 0.04 (-) 1.39 (-) - 0.03 - - (-) - (-) - 1,562
1981 3.78 (8.99) 1.41 (2.12) 5.19 (11.11) - 1.03 - - (-) - (-) 15 7,053
1986 10.47 (9.78) 7.55 (5.61) 18.02 (15.39) - 5.24 - - (-) - (1.33) 44 21,269
1991 37.61 (32.14) 26.63 (17.46) 64.24 (49.60) 51.77* 19.66 71.43 - (-) - (2.58) 112 30,506
1996 73.13 (32.91) 61.46 (7.83) 134.9 (40.73) 87.63 53.56 141.19 2.59** (-) 6.94** (20.87) 2,311 44,229
2001 87.43 (46.54) 70.02 (9.42) 157.5 (55.96) 103.64 63.66 167.30 4.94 (-) 8.50 (16.72) 4,449 74,345
2002 91.93 (58.46) 78.62 (10.73) 170.55 (69.19) 110.77 73.32 184.09 4.06 (-) 15.94 (17.86) 6,825 80,808
2003 100.72 (76.27) 95.20 (11.12) 195.92 (87.39) 123.99 90.49 214.48 4.87 (1.15) 7.68 (17.70) 8,467 77,527
2004 117.73 (100.87) 113.92 (11.80) 231.64 (112.67) 145.57 109.06 254.63 7.95 (2.63) 18.56 (19.00) 12,246 88,421
2005 134.53 (124.47) 129.82 (12.23) 264.35 (136.70) 168.36 124.09 292.45 9.35 (3.42) 16.71 (17.95) 12,541 95,928
2006 152.94 (155.31) 148.23 (10.78) 301.17 (166.09) 187.35 143.07 330.42 13.94 (6.93) 21.36 (20.23) 13,591 98,318
2007 170.47 (184.44) 167.74 (12.80) 338.20 (197.24) 204.84 162.53 367.73 13.36 (13.73) 36.40 (27.70) 15,486 101,136
2008 180.86 (190.73) 175.70 (12.92) 356.56 (203.64) 218.94 171.24 390.18 23.04 (38.64) 27.59 (41.04) 16,862 101,317
2009 160.83 (166.23) 3.44 (8.71) 164.27 (174.95) -- -- 159.18 -- -- -- (46.08) 17,957 155,000
Table 1 – Trade, Investment, and Tourism between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 1978–2009
Notes: 1. Figures may not add up to the totals due to rounding. w 2. “-” indicates that statistical data are unavailable, unknown, or negligible. w 3. Statistics from mainland Chinese sources are given in brackets. 
w 4. Figures for mainland imports from HK exclude HK’s re-exports to China. w 5. * Figure for 1992. w 6. ** Figures for 1998. w 7. *** No. of Hong Kong visitors to the mainland includes visitors from Macau.
Source: Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “Hong Kong Statistics,” http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/index.jsp; A Statistical Review
of Tourism (1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996 issues), Hong Kong, Research Department, Hong Kong Tourism Association, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997; Hong Kong Tourism Board, Visitor Arrival Statistics (published
monthly), http://partnernet.hktourismboard.com; State Statistical Bureau, People’s Republic of China (comp.), China Statistical Yearbook (1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009 issues), China
Statistics Press, Beijing,1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009; and Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People’s Republic of
China, 2008 Niandu Zhongguo duiwai zhijie touzi tongji gongbao (2008 statistical bulletin of China’s outward foreign direct investment), September 2009, http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/
200909/1253868856016.pdf. 
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administration; those who trusted the Chinese amounted to less than 20
percent, while only 12 percent trusted the Chinese government. (14) A
similar pattern emerged in various surveys on the same subject in the
1990s. Hence, the Chinese authorities should be satisfied with the
achievements of its united front charm offensive in the territory. This
trust in the central government and confidence in “one country, two sys-
tems” implies that Hong Kong people are less inclined to demand
democracy as a checks and balances mechanism against Beijing, in con-
trast to the mentality of “the exploitation of democracy as a bulwark
against communism,” which hit its peak in the wake of the Tiananmen
Incident in June 1989. (15)
In terms of Hong Kong people’s identity, there have been positive
changes in the long-term trends from Beijing’s point of view, though the
changes are more limited. As shown by Table 3, there has been a fairly
steady decline in Hong Kong people identifying themselves as “Hong Kong
citizens,” and a shift toward identifying themselves as “Chinese Hong Kong
citizens,” though there was reversal of this trend in 2008 and 2009. Simi-
larly, there has been a fairly steady rise in Hong Kong people identifying
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July to December 2009 87.2% 8.5% 49.6% 18.8% 68.1% 26.0%
January to June 2009 88.2% 8.2% 52.6% 15.4% 72.5% 21.7%
July to December 2008 88.1% 7.9% 53.1% 14.4% 71.8% 21.6%
January to June 2008 87.9% 7.9% 54.9% 13.4% 74.6% 18.7%
July to December 2007 87.6% 7.8% 54.4% 15.6% 74.9% 18.8%
January to June 2007 87.5% 8.1% 49.9% 15.5% 72.9% 20.8%
July to December 2006 85.7% 9.3% 44.6% 19.7% 70.4% 23.6%
January to June 2006 85.0% 9.3% 48.5% 18.7% 69.4% 22.6%
July to December 2005 82.0% 11.0% 46.8% 24.4% 65.1% 25.3%
January to June 2005 79.0% 11.4% 43.2% 24.7% 57.2% 28.2%
July to December 2004 83.4% 9.2% 47.0% 20.9% 59.3% 28.4%
January to June 2004 82.6% 8.8% 40.0% 25.6% 51.7% 33.1%
July to December 2003 82.7% 8.3% 45.7% 20.6% 53.7% 30.9%
January to June 2003 79.1% 11.0% 37.6% 29.4% 49.2% 38.4%
July to December 2002 81.7% 9.6% 41.0% 26.2% 52.7% 34.3%
January to June 2002 81.1% 8.6% 48.6% 20.6% 58.7% 28.3%
July to December 2001 79.9% 10.0% 43.9% 22.1% 59.2% 27.3%
January to June 2001 - - 33.8% 31.1% 56.7% 30.4%
July to December 2000 - - 31.6% 31.0% 58.2% 27.5%
January to June 2000 - - 31.9% 27.3% 62.0% 22.5%
July to December 1999 - - 29.3% 29.7% 56.3% 29.6%
January to June 1999 78.6% 10.5% 27.3% 27.4% 57.7% 28.3%
July to December 1998 - - 30.5% 30.7% 66.6% 21.9%
January to June 1998 71.0% 15.0% 28.7% 30.1% 64.5% 20.8%
July to December 1997 73.1% 11.8% 32.4% 29.9% 64.0% 18.7%
Table 2 – Hong Kong People’s Confidence in China and Trust for the Chinese Leadership as Reflected 
by Public Opinion Surveys, 1997-2009 (half-yearly average)
Notes : 
1. Question asked for (A) – Do you have confidence in China’s future? The other option was “don’t know/hard to say,” which is not included in this table.
2. Question asked for (B) – On the whole, do you trust the Beijing Central Government? The other options were “half-half” and “don’t know/hard to say,” which are not included in this table.
3. Question asked for (C) – On the whole, do you have confidence in “One Country, Two Systems”? The other option was “don’t know/hard to say,” which is not included in this table.
Source: Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, http://hkupop.hku.hk/, retrieved on 25 January 2010.
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Confident Not Confident Confident Not Confident
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Date of Survey
14. Sing Tao Evening Post, 5 February 1996.
15. See Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong,” in George Hicks (ed.), The Broken Mir-
ror: China After Tiananmen, Harlow, Essex, UK, Longman Group UK Limited, 1990, pp. 278-295.
themselves as “Chinese citizens” rather than “Hong Kong Chinese citizens”;
again there was a reversal of the trend from mid-2008 to mid-2009. A
more perplexing phenomenon is that the strength of identity of Hong
Kong people as Hong Kong citizens and as Chinese citizens have both been
rising, though the latter again showed a small decline from mid-2008 to
mid-2009. Stronger identification as “Chinese Hong Kong citizens” and
“Chinese citizens” on the part of Hong Kong people may mean that they
are more willing to accept reducing the differences between the territory
and the mainland.
The influence of the pro-Beijing united front has certainly been expand-
ing rapidly since 1997. The resources at its disposal have been most im-
pressive. The Chinese authorities and the HKSAR government can reward
united front activists with decorations, honours, prestigious positions such
as deputies and delegates to the National Committee of the CPPCC as well
as local counterparts, and appointments to various advisory committees of
the HKSAR government. In many ways, the united front is becoming the
most influential social club in the territory, where one can establish busi-
ness ties and raise one’s social profile. Deputies to the NPC and delegates
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July to December 2009 37.6% 23.9% 13.1% 24.2% 8.14 7.79
January to June 2009 24.7% 32.0% 13.3% 29.3% 7.83 7.72
July to December 2008 21.8% 29.6% 13.0% 34.4% 7.99 7.79
January to June 2008 18.1% 29.2% 13.3% 38.6% 7.80 8.02
July to December 2007 23.5% 31.5% 16.0% 27.2% 8.09 7.87
January to June 2007 23.4% 31.8% 16.7% 26.4% 8.00 7.66
July to December 2006 22.4% 24.3% 20.1% 31.8% 7.98 7.82
January to June 2006 24.8% 25.1% 14.9% 34.6% 7.79 7.68
July to December 2005 24.8% 26.5% 16.9% 30.7% 7.91 7.73
January to June 2005 24.0% 21.2% 14.7% 36.4% 7.77 7.56
July to December 2004 25.9% 23.1% 16.2% 31.6% 7.54 7.47
January to June 2004 28.0% 21.2% 14.3% 33.0% 7.54 7.48
July to December 2003 24.9% 23.4% 15.6% 32.5% 7.41 7.52
January to June 2003 32.6% 20.8% 13.5% 30.7% - 7.54
July to December 2002 30.0% 21.7% 14.7% 31.1% - 7.63
January to June 2002 29.9% 20.7% 15.5% 30.4% - 7.76
July to December 2001 29.0% 24.2% 14.0% 28.7% - 7.85
January to June 2001 33.8% 20.0% 14.7% 28.3% - 7.78
July to December 2000 36.3% 23.0% 14.2% 21.3% - 7.62
January to June 2000 37.5% 22.5% 15.9% 19.0% - 7.50
July to December 1999 33.5% 22.6% 17.0% 23.6% - 7.27
January to June 1999 41.4% 22.0% 13.2% 17.5% - 7.02
July to December 1998 36.6% 23.5% 16.7% 19.9% - 7.18
January to June 1998 32.2% 18.3% 17.4% 28.2% - 7.10
July to December 1997 35.9% 23.6% 19.9% 18.0% - 7.28
Table 3 – Hong Kong People’s Identity as Reflected by Public Opinion Surveys, 1997-2009
(half-yearly average)
Notes : 
1. Question asked for (A) – You would identify yourself as a Hong Kong Citizen/Chinese Citizen/Hong Kong Chinese Citizen/Chinese Hong Kong Citizen. The other options were “other” and “don’t know/hard to
say,” which are not included in this table.
2. Question asked for (B) – Please use a scale of 0-10 to rate your strength of identity as a Hong Kong citizen, with 10 indicating extremely strong, 0 indicating extremely weak, and 5 indicating half-half. How
would you rate yourself? 
3. Question asked for (C) – Please use a scale of 0-10 to rate your strength of identity as a Chinese citizen, with 10 indicating extremely strong, 0 indicating extremely weak, and 5 indicating half-half. How would
you rate yourself?
Source: Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/index.html, retrieved on 25 January 2010.
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to the National Committee of the CPPCC enjoy the privilege of meeting
central government ministers and provincial heads at will; one can easily
imagine how valuable this privilege can be for Hong Kong businessmen in
China. Members of the advisory committee system of the HKSAR govern-
ment likewise have good access to senior government officials. The large
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong have been generous in supporting the united front’s activities. Even
grassroots leaders such as mutual aid committee chairmen of public hous-
ing estates have been treated to visits to the mainland, where they are
pampered by local officials.
All of this easily explains why the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) claims a membership of well
over 10,000, while the largest pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party
(DP), has a membership of about 600, with only about one third remaining
active. It is also significant that the DP and the Civic Party (CP), another
pro-democracy party with strong appeal to liberal middle-class profession-
als, do not have any mid-level executives of major corporations as their
formal member. While almost all major enterprises in Hong Kong have sig-
nificant business activities in mainland China, their mid-level executives do
not want to be associated with pro-democracy political parties that are
critical of the Chinese authorities. As most of the media in Hong Kong are
in the hands of the major business groups, self-censorship has been on the
rise since the 1990s.
Since the mid-1980s, the pro-Beijing united front in Hong Kong has been
gradually building an effective election machine in support of its candi-
dates in various elections. Its mobilisation power and sophisticated cam-
paign strategies were well demonstrated in the Legislative Council elec-
tions in 2004 and 2008 as well as in the District Council elections in 2003
and 2007. (16)
The Chinese leadership is trapped in a fundamental dilemma. It has been
trying hard to support Hong Kong economically in line with the ultimate
objectives of ensuring political stability and demonstrating to the world
that Beijing can administer the territory better than London. This active
support and intervention has made Hong Kong people aware of their de-
pendence on the Mainland, but they are also concerned with maintaining
checks-and-balances mechanisms through support for the pro-democracy
movement. Since Chinese leaders understand that they lack complete
control over Hong Kong’s political scene, they have been reluctant to allow
genuine local democracy. They therefore have failed to win the hearts of
those who still vote for the pro-democracy candidates in elections, and
must absorb part of the blame for the unsatisfactory performance of the
local government. (17) As indicated above, it seems that economic difficul-
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16. For some observations on the operation of this effective election machinery on the part of the pro-
Beijing united front, see the author’s “Introduction – Hong Kong Since Its Return to China: A Lost
Decade?”, in his edited volume, The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade, Hong
Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press, 2007, pp. 43 and 46-47.
17. Despite some signs of economic recovery, dissatisfaction with the Donald Tsang administration was on
the rise at the end of 2009. According to the series of public opinion surveys conducted by the Public
Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong, a poll at the end of October 2009 showed that
25.4 percent of the respondents were very satisfied/ quite satisfied with Donald Tsang’s policy direc-
tion, 28.8 percent said half-half, and 41 percent were quite dissatisfied/ very dissatisfied with his policy
direction. In another survey during the same period, 34.6 percent of the respondents indicated that
they would vote for Donald Tsang (if they had the right to vote and the election was to be held to-
morrow), while 48.5 percent said that they would not. Information is available at
http://hkupop.hku.hk/.
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1997 1,365,024 11.0 1,113,824 5.1 122.6 5.7 210,350 10.1 171,640 4.2
1998 1,292,764 -5.3 1,046,700 -6.0 123.5 0.8 197,559 -6.1 159,955 -6.8
1999 1,266,668 -2.0 1,073,453 2.6 118.0 -4.5 191,731 -3.0 162,484 1.6
2000 1,317,650 4.0 1,158,807 8.0 113.7 -3.6 197,697 3.1 173,865 7.0
2001 1,299,218 -1.4 1,164,568 0.5 111.6 -1.9 193,500 -2.1 173,446 -0.2
2002 1,277,314 -1.7 1,186,008 1.8 107.7 -3.5 189,397 -2.1 175,859 1.4
2003 1,234,761 -3.3 1,221,659 3.0 101.1 -6.2 183,449 -3.1 181,503 3.2
2004 1,291,923 4.6 1,325,091 8.5 97.5 -3.5 190,451 3.8 195,340 7.6
2005 1,382,590 7.0 1,418,935 7.1 97.4 -0.1 202,928 6.6 208,263 6.6
2006 1,475,357 6.7 1,518,541 7.0 97.2 -0.3 215,158 6.0 221,455 6.3
2007# 1,615,455 9.5 1,615,455 6.4 100.0 2.9 233,248 8.4 233,248 5.3
2008# 1,675,315 3.7 1,650,556 2.2 101.5 1.5 240,327 3.0 236,775 1.5
2009 1,632,284 - 2.6 1,604,999 -2.8 101.7 0.2 233,060 -3.0 229,164 -3.2
Table 4 – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Hong Kong, 1997–2009
Notes: 
1. Figures in this table are the latest data released on 13 November 2009.
2. # indicates that the figures will be finalised when data from all regular sources are incorporated.
Source: Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “Hong Kong Statistics – Statistical Tables.” Retrieved from http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_sta-
tistics/statistical_tables/index. jsp?charsetID=1&subjectID=12&tableID=030 on 22 January 2010 and 22 August 2010.
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ties and the bad performance of the HKSAR government have a spill-over
effect on the community’s trust in the central government and its confi-
dence in “one country, two systems.” More significant still, Chinese leaders’
influence and intervention in Hong Kong have destroyed the appeal of the
“one country, two systems” model for Taiwan.
The HKSAR government’s legitimacy deficit
The British colonial administration won its legitimacy by performance. (18)
Even today, many Hong Kong people still compare it favourably with the
C. H. Tung and Donald Tsang administrations. After 1997, the Chinese au-
thorities responded to the political crises in the HKSAR by offering strong
economic support. Their rationale was simple: if the economy improved,
the people would largely be satisfied and they would be much less inter-
ested in democracy. Political stability would no longer be challenged.
When Donald Tsang visited Beijing on his duty trip in December 2006, he
told the central government that “Hong Kong’s economy is the best it has
been in almost twenty years.” (19) Many Hong Kong people disagreed, how-
ever, even in the period of economic boom. Based on the views expressed
in various radio phone-in programmes, people did not feel they had bene-
fited from economic growth in recent years.
A study by the Bauhinia Foundation, a think-tank close to Donald Tsang,
revealed that the median household income in 2005 was still 15.8 percent
lower than that in the previous peak year of 1997. More serious still, be-
tween 1996 and 2005, the number of households with a monthly income
below HK$8,000 rose by 76.5 percent, to more than 500,000; and their
proportion of the total number of households rose from 13 percent to 22
percent. (20)
According to the Census and Statistics Department, in June 2009, there
were 0.3944 million workers earning less than HK$4,000 (about US$500)
per month, compared with 0.3 million in 2001. (21) This low-income cate-
gory, sometimes described by sociologists as the “working poor,” mainly
consists of workers without skills and of low educational qualifications. As
more than 90 percent of the territory’s GDP comes from the service sector,
the decline in the manufacturing industries means demand for unskilled
workers has been falling fast. The hourly wage at MacDonald’s outlets
(around US$2.5) is a good indicator of the surplus of unskilled labour.
A research project at the Chinese University of Hong Kong revealed that
its comprehensive quality of life index dropped 3.5 percent in 2008 com-
pared with that in 2007, almost back to the level in 2003, when the terri-
tory was badly hit by the SARS epidemic. Between 2007 and 2008, Hong
Kong people’s evaluation of the economy and of the affordability of their
own accommodation likewise fell 30 percent and 33 percent, respec-
tively. (22)
Dr. Ohmae Kenichi believes the vast majority of Japanese will fall into the
lower-middle class socio-economic group because globalisation will widen
the gap between rich and poor and exacerbate social polarisation. (23) Per-
haps Hong Kong’s new graduates can most easily associate with Dr.
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18. See Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Political Modernization in Hong Kong,” The Journal of Commonwealth & Com-
parative Politics, vol. XXVII, no. 3, November 1989, pp. 294-320.
19. South China Morning Post, 28 December 2006.
20. Ibid., 10 January 2007; and Ming Pao, 10 January 2007.
21. Ibid., 8 June 2009.
22. Ibid., 14 August 2009.
23. See Ohmae Kenichi, The Impact of Rising Lower-middle Class Population in Japan: What Can We Do
About It (in Japanese), Tokyo, Kodansha, 2006.
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Notes: Figures in this table are the latest data updated on 19 August 2010. 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “Hong Kong Statistics – Statistical Tables.” Retrieved from http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_sta-
tistics/statistical_tables/index.jsp?charsetID =1&subjectID=12&tableID=006 on 22 January 2010; and http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistical_tables/ index.jsp?charsetID=1&tableID=006
on 22 August 2010.
Year
Number 
(thousand)
% 
change
Unemployed
(thousand)
Unemployment 
rate (%)
Underemployed
(thousand)
Underemployment
rate (%)
1997 3,234.8 2.3 71.2 2.2 37.1 1.1
1998 3,276.1 1.3 154.1 4.7 81.8 2.5
1999 3,319.6 1.3 207.5 6.2 96.9 2.9
2000 3,374.2 1.6 166.9 4.9 93.5 2.8
2001 3,427.3 1.6 174.3 5.1 84.8 2.5
2002 3,472.6 1.3 254.2 7.3 104.4 3.0
2003 3,465.8 -0.2 275.2 7.9 121.9 3.5
2004 3,512.8 1.4 239.2 6.8 114.3 3.3
2005 3,534.2 0.6 197.6 5.6 96.3 2.7
2006 3,571.8 1.1 171.1 4.8 86.3 2.4
2007 3,629.6 1.6 145.7 4.0 79.2 2.2
2008 3,648.9 0.5 130.1 3.6 69.0 1.9
2009 3,676.6 0.8 196.7 5.4 86.4 2.3
Table 5 – Table Statistics on Labour Force, Unemployment, and Underemployment in Hong Kong, 1997–2009
Labour Force
Ohmae’s arguments. The median monthly salary of new graduates is be-
tween HK$10,000 and HK$11,000; many also owe the government
HK$200,000 or so in student loans. Unless they can depend on their par-
ents for food and accommodation, they will have difficulty maintaining a
middle-class lifestyle. Neither can they expect steady promotions or salary
increases. Many still earn a monthly salary of HK$20,000 to $25,000 after
more than a decade of employment and cannot achieve meaningful break-
throughs in their careers.
Before 1997, unemployment was not a concern in Hong Kong. The com-
munity believed that anyone who was willing to work should have no dif-
ficulty finding a job. In recent years, it has had to accept an unemployment
rate higher than those in the United States and United Kingdom. Hence,
even those who are gainfully employed worry about the employment of
their next generation.
The unemployment issue has been compounded by the widening gap
between rich and poor. It has been reported that Hong Kong people have
the highest individual net worth in the world, amounting to US$202,000.
According to a global study by the United Nations’ World Institute for De-
velopment Economics Research in 2006, Hong Kong was ahead of Luxem-
bourg, Switzerland, and the United States, which ranked second, third, and
fourth respectively, while Japan ranked ninth and Singapore twelfth. (24)
From 1981 to 2001, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient steadily rose from 0.451
to 0.525 (see Table 7a); in terms of this measurement of income distribu-
tion, Hong Kong compared rather unfavourably with developed countries,
and was in a situation comparable to Argentina and Zambia (see Table 7b).
Up to a third of Hong Kong’s labour force has nine years of formal edu-
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Month of survey
Total 
sample
Very 
satisfied
Quite 
satisfied
Half-half
Not quite
satisfied
Very 
dissatisfied
Don’t know/
Hard to say
July to December 2009 6,033 3.4% 28.3% 35.8% 21.1% 10.9% 0.6%
January to June 2009 6,068 3.1% 24.9% 40.4% 20.5% 10.7% 0.4%
July to December 2008 6,213 2.7% 24.3% 41.9% 20.4% 9.6% 1.1%
January to June 2008 6,120 5.4% 42.2% 37.3% 10.2% 3.9% 1.0%
July to December 2007 6,072 5.2% 46.4% 35.1% 9.0% 3.2% 1.1%
January to June 2007 7,084 5.4% 42.0% 39.1% 9.3% 2.9% 1.2%
July to December 2006 6,076 4.2% 37.8% 41.7% 11.4% 3.7% 1.1%
January to June 2006 7,113 5.8% 45.7% 36.5% 8.5% 2.4% 1.1%
July to December 2005 6,097 5.2% 44.0% 35.7% 9.5% 3.1% 2.4%
January to June 2005 6,109 2.9% 26.2% 37.9% 20.2% 8.6% 4.3%
July to December 2004 6,148 2.7% 17.5% 35.3% 27.6% 14.2% 2.8%
January to June 2004 6,207 1.9% 13.0% 33.1% 30.6% 18.1% 3.5%
July to December 2003 7,364 1.5% 12.2% 26.9% 35.3% 21.3% 3.0%
January to June 2003 6,293 1.1% 14.3% 25.6% 36.9% 18.6% 3.6%
July to December 2002 6,260 1.0% 17.0% 28.1% 37.9% 11.3% 4.8%
January to June 2002 6,217 1.3% 23.7% 31.3% 32.8% 6.1% 4.9%
July to December 2001 6,321 1.0% 19.2% 30.9% 33.4% 10.5% 5.0%
January to June 2001 6,348 1.3% 25.3% 35.0% 26.7% 6.5% 5.2%
July to December 2000 6,324 1.5% 19.9% 31.3% 32.1% 9.6% 5.7%
January to June 2000 4,240 1.6% 22.4% 39.1% 22.9% 9.0% 5.1%
July to December 1999 3,205 1.4% 22.8% 39.2% 23.6% 8.0% 5.0%
January to June 1999 4,213 0.7% 24.5% 39.9% 26.3% 5.4% 3.2%
July to December 1998 4,755 1.0% 21.7% 35.8% 29.0% 8.0% 4.6%
January to June 1998 3,744 0.8% 27.4% 38.7% 23.0% 4.6% 5.5%
July to December 1997 3,181 1.9% 40.7% 32.7% 13.6% 1.9% 9.3%
Table 6 – People’s Satisfaction with the HKSAR Government – Half-yearly Average, 1997-2009
Survey question: Are you satisfied with the overall performance of the HKSAR Government? (half-yearly average) 
Source: Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, “People’s Satisfaction with the HKSAR Government – half-yearly average.” Retrieved from http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/
sargperf/sarg/halfyr/datatables.html on 22 January 2010.
cation or less; they will naturally find it difficult to benefit from the terri-
tory’s economic growth. Exacerbated income inequality easily leads to a
sense of grievance and possibly also to social instability. 
In the era of the British colonial administration, the free market led to the
concentration of wealth and the unequal distribution of income. In the
colonial political system, however, power was highly concentrated among
the expatriate senior officials of the colonial government, who were per-
ceived to be neutral, efficient, and largely free of corruption. This separa-
tion of political power and wealth in fact constituted a form of checks and
balances. But since the return of Hong Kong to China, most people per-
ceive a rapid expansion of influence over the HKSAR government on the
part of the major business groups. The latter have experienced rapid asset
growth and have significant investment projects on the mainland. They
therefore enjoy good access to China’s top leaders, who are eager to at-
tract external investment as well as maintain investor confidence in Hong
Kong. Business leaders’ assessment of the HKSAR government’s perform-
ance have apparently had considerable impact on Chinese leaders’ evalua-
tion of the Tung and Tsang administrations, which in turn have shown great
respect for the interests of major local business groups.
In recent years, critics of the HKSAR government often illustrate the col-
lusion between the government and local business interests with the fol-
lowing examples. Middle-class families spend their life savings on their ac-
commodation, while real estate developers refuse to reveal the exact
measurements of their flats. Working people make monthly contributions
to their pension funds and various insurance schemes, but do not even
know how much they are paying in commissions and management fees.
Supermarkets provide false information on their discounts, and have not
been sanctioned after media reports; worse still, consumers have no other
options. These examples vividly reflect the oligopolistic control of the mar-
ket by the territory’s major business groups, while the government has
been reluctant to introduce fair competition legislation to protect the in-
terests of consumers and small investors.
The perception of government-business collusion has been exacerbated
by the fact that many top government officials join major corporations
soon after their retirement with very attractive remuneration packages. At
the same time, the official advisory committee system has been dominated
by a small elite of 300 or 400 people, including spouses and children of top
business leaders. Worse still, some of them are so much favoured by the
government that they sit on more than ten advisory committees, with their
tenures extending beyond six years, in violation of established conventions.
From the very first policy address of C. H. Tung to the most recent one of
the Tsang administration, the HKSAR government has been trying hard to
maintain the territory’s international competitiveness and a respectable
economic growth rate. Obviously they have not been successful. In his last
policy address delivered on 14 October 2009, Donald Tsang identified six
industries with a strategic edge, and indicated that the government would
support them with land grants and various subsidies. (25) In contrast to
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Article
Source: Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government, 1991 Population Census Main Report, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1992; Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Population Census 2001 Main Report – Volume I, Hong Kong, Printing Department, 2002; and Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2006 Population By-census – Thematic Report: Household Income Distribution in Hong Kong, retrieved from http://www.bycensus2006.gov.hk/FileManager/EN/Content_962/06bc_hhinc.pdf
on 22 January 2010.
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2007
Gini Coefficient 0.451 0.453 0.476 0.518 0.525 0.533 0,434
Table 7 (a) – Gini Coefficient of Hong Kong
Source: The figures for Hong Kong, Canada, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the United States are from the Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
2006 Population By-census – Thematic Report: Household Income Distribution in Hong Kong, retrieved from http://www.bycensus2006.gov.hk/FileManager/EN/Content_ 962/06bc_hhinc.pdf on 22 January 2010;
the figures for Taiwan is from Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2009, Taipei, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Exec-
utive Yuan, June 2009; and the remaining figures are from the database of The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators (WDI) Online.
Region/Country Gini Coefficient Survey year
South Africa 0.578 2000
Brazil 0.550 2007
Hong Kong, China 0.533 2006
United Kingdom 0.510 2004/05
Canada 0.510 2004
Zambia 0.507 2004
Argentina 0.500 2005
Singapore 0.481 2000
United States 0.450 2005
Taiwan 0.340 2007
South Korea 0.316 1998
Germany 0.283 2000
Sweden 0.250 2000
Tableau 7 (b) – Gini Coefficients of Hong Kong and Selected Economies
25. For the contents of the policy address and the initial responses, see all major newspapers of Hong Kong
on 15 October 2009.
Japan and the other “three little dragons of Asia,” however, the HKSAR gov-
ernment does not control the banking and financial systems, nor does it
possess state-owned investment funds and corporations to actively pro-
mote the development of strategic sectors. The Donald Tsang administra-
tion has therefore been perceived as ineffective even by the business com-
munity and the pro-Beijing united front.
The legitimacy deficit of the HKSAR government largely explains why it
has been trying to avoid controversial issues. In an ageing society with a
sharply falling fertility rate, the financial burden of social services will in-
crease. Taxation will rise in the absence of administrative reforms. At this
stage, Hong Kong’s Mandatory Provident Fund is inadequate to provide for
the community’s retirement, and Hong Kong people have yet to tackle the
long-term financing of their hospital services. Both the Tung and the Tsang
administrations have been reluctant to expand the taxation base and in-
troduce a value-added tax and/or ask Hong Kong people to increase their
contribution to the Mandatory Provident Fund and pay for their own med-
ical insurance. These are unpopular though essential policy programmes
that a government without an electoral mandate and which has not been
performing well can easily postpone, with the burden ultimately falling on
the people further down the road.
The challenges for the pro-democracy
movement
The pro-democracy movement has been in a difficult state. There is con-
siderable frustration with the lack of progress, as no one expects any break-
through soon. Even the political parties in the pro-democracy camp do not
believe that democratisation is an issue with much political appeal. They
can make very little impact on the government’s policy-making process
because the Tung and Tsang administrations have enjoyed the backing of a
safe majority in the legislature; they do not have to lobby for the approval
of the pro-democracy groups, which are treated as the opposition. In fact,
there has been little meaningful consultation between the pro-democracy
groups and the government.
The sense of political impotence on the part of the pro-democracy
groups has been exacerbated by Hong Kong people’s growing trust in
China (see Table 2). Attacking the Chinese authorities’ infringement on the
community’s freedoms and human rights has become less attractive to
voters than before. The most important concerns of Hong Kong people are
obviously the economy and unemployment, and the pro-democracy
groups are not perceived as having much to offer.
Before Hong Kong’s return to China, there was substantial moral and
public opinion pressure to maintain unity within the pro-democracy camp.
Such pressure evaporated soon after July 1997. In the frustration of the po-
litical wilderness, differences in political orientations have been exacer-
bated and can no longer be contained. These differences are most evident
in the responses to the recently released Political Reform Proposals. The
Civic Party (CP) and the League of Social Democrats (LSD) proposed an
implicit referendum on the Political Reform Proposals through the resigna-
tion of one pro-democracy legislator in each of the five geographical con-
stituencies. By-elections would then have to be held, and the resigned pro-
democracy legislators would seek re-election on a common single-issue
political platform of rejecting the HKSAR government’s Political Reform
Proposals and demanding “dual universal suffrage” as soon as possible. The
rationale for this proposal was that this was the only way to mobilise the
entire electorate of the territory to indicate its stand on the issue of
democracy and, hopefully, to demonstrate to the HKSAR government, the
Chinese authorities, and the international community that the pro-democ-
racy movement still enjoyed majority support among the Hong Kong pop-
ulation. 
The Democratic Party (DP) and the other pro-democracy groups repre-
sentation in the legislature refused to support the “pseudo-referendum”
plan, however. They asserted that it was too risky precisely because the
electorate was apathetic regarding the issue of democratisation, and any
loss in the five geographical constituencies would tarnish the image of the
pro-democracy movement. The DP and like-minded pro-democracy
groups worried about the effective electoral machinery of the pro-Beijing
united front, and openly stated the importance of retaining the veto in the
legislature concerning the Political Reform Proposals. (26)
The voter turnout rate for the Legislative Council by-elections on 16 May
2010 was 17.1 percent, with about 580,000 voters coming out to vote. As
expected, both sides had scripts prepared and offered well-anticipated in-
terpretations. (27) The Tsang administration and the pro-Beijing united front
emphasised the low turnout and hence the failure of the “de facto refer-
endum.” Naturally they could report to the Chinese authorities that they
had successfully discredited the campaign. 
The crucial turning-point was Beijing’s decision not to allow the pro-es-
tablishment parties to take part in the exercise. Chinese leaders obviously
considered the “de facto referendum” a very sensitive precedent, and de-
cided that the danger outweighed the potential of snatching one or two
seats from the pro-democracy camp in the by-elections. In the end, the
pro-establishment political parties refused to participate in the by-elec-
tions.
The Tsang administration was under pressure to do more to discredit the
by-elections. Tsang’s own decision not to vote certainly destroyed the neu-
trality of the executive branch in organising the elections of the legislature.
It also compromised the spirit of the rule of law. Even if the administration
believed that the legislators or political parties had exploited a loophole in
the existing legislation by treating the resignations and the by-elections as
a “de facto referendum,” the government should still have followed the
law, organised the elections, carried out the usual publicity work to encour-
age people to vote, etc. It could then consider closing the loophole after-
wards.
A voter turnout rate of 17.1 percent was not a satisfactory performance
for a “de facto referendum,” but as a protest campaign, mobilising more
than half a million people to say no to the Tsang administration’s package
of political reform proposals was quite an achievement, especially consid-
ering all the efforts to discredit the campaign by Chinese officials and the
pro-Beijing united front. Meanwhile, Beijing continued to approach the de-
mocratisation issue only within a united front framework. On the day fol-
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26. According to Annex I to the Basic Law, amendment of the method for selecting the Chief Executive
“must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative
Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee
of the NPC for approval.” According to Annex II to the Basic Law, amendment of the method for form-
ing the Legislative Council “must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the
members of the (Legislative) Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported
to the Standing Committee of the NPC for the record.” The provisions were initially intended to make
changes to the electoral system difficult, with the final decision-making power in the hands of the Chi-
nese authorities; but these provisions also offer veto power to the pro-democracy legislators regarding
any electoral reform proposals initiated by the HKSAR government, as long as they control more than
20 (one third) of the seats in the legislature. At present, they hold 23 seats in the Legislative Council.
27. See all major Hong Kong newspapers on 17 and 18 May 2010.
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Article
Date
of Survey
FTU HKCTU CivicParty ADPL DAB DP LP LSD
HKAS
PDMC Frontier AFA NWS
19-23/11/2009 51.7 (2) 51.3 (3) 50.2 (4) 50.1 (5) 48.9 (6) 48.4 (7) 44.9 (9) 40.6 (10) 46.6 (8) - - 51.8 (1)
18-25/8/2009 52.2 (1) 51.1 (2) 49.5 (5) 49.9 (3) 49.0 (6) 49.7 (4) 44.6 (8) 40.3 (9) 47.0 (7) - 38.2 (10) -
19-22/5/2009 52.6 (1) 51.7 (2) 51.3 (3) 49.9 (4) 48.7 (6) 48.8 (5) 44.9 (9) 39.6 (10) 48.0 (7) 47.6 (8) - -
16-18/2/2009 52.9 (1) 51.6 (2) 49.7 (4) 49.7 (5) 50.4 (3) 48.3 (6) 43.5 (9) 43.8 (8) - 46.5 (7) 36.5 (10) -
26-30/11/2008 53.4 (1) 52.3 (2) 51.1 (3) 50.7 (4) 48.5 (6) 49.5 (5) 41.0 (9) 45.4 (8) - 46.6 (7) 36.5 (10) -
18-20/8/2008 53.3 (1) 51.7 (3) 52.4 (2) 51.0 (4) 48.5 (5) 47.7 (6) 47.4 (7) - 44.0 (9) 46.2 (8) 35.4 (10) -
20-22/5/2008 55.7 (1) 52.1 (4) 53.1 (3) 51.1 (5) 53.6 (2) 48.7 (7) 49.8 (6) - 46.4 (8) 45.9 (9) 35.7 (10) -
18-20/2/2008 53.7 (1) 51.5 (4) 51.8 (2) 49.3 (5) 51.6 (3) 48.6 (7) 49.1 (6) - 45.1 (9) 46.2 (8) 35.7 (10) -
21-26/11/2007 52.3 (2) 50.0 (4) 51.9 (3) 48.9 (6) 52.6 (1) 47.0 (7) 46.4 (8) - - 45.3 (9) 33.0 (10) 49.7 (5)
13-16/8/2007 55.0 (1) 50.0 (6) 50.7 (4) 50.2 (5) 54.8 (2) 48.0 (7) 52.3 (3) - 44.1 (9) 45.4 (8) 34.3 (10) -
16-25/5/2007 53.5 (1) 50.4 (5) 51.7 (2) 51.3 (3) 49.6 (7) 49.8 (6) 51.2 (4) - 46.9 (8) 46.1 (9) 35.7 (10) -
12-14/2/2007 51.3 (3) 51.4 (2) 51.5 (1) 49.3 (5) 48.3 (6) 50.0 (4) 48.0 (7) - 44.5 (9) 45.5 (8) 34.7 (10) -
20-24/11/2006 53.2 (1) 51.5 (4) 51.9 (2) 50 (5) 49.2 (6) 48.4 (8) 49.1 (7) - - 47.3 (9) 36.9 (10) 51.6 (3)
11-15/8/2006 53.2 (1) 49.1 (3) 49.4 (2) 49.1 (4) 49.1 (5) 45.2 (7) 48.9 (6) - 40.6 (9) 43.2 (8) 33.1 (10) -
18-25/5/2006 54.2 (1) 52.6 (2) 52.2 (3) 50.5 (5) 51.1 (4) 47.4 (7) 50.2 (6) - 44.8 (9) 46.6 (8) 37.6 (10) -
9-14/2/2006 52.5 (2) 51.7 (3) 53.8 (1) 49.6 (4) 49.5 (5) 46.9 (7) 48.9 (6) - 43.9 (9) 45.1 (8) 35.6 (10) -
18-23/11/2005 52.7 (2) 51.7 (3) 53.8 (1) 48.0 (6) 47.5 (7) 48.2 (5) 49.7 (4) - 45.7 (9) 46.5 (8) 37.5 (10) -
22-25/8/2005 52.0 (2) 51.1 (3) 54.1 (1) 49.7 (5) 47.7 (6) 47.4 (7) 50.1 (4) - 46.2 (8) 45.5 (9) 35.8 (10) -
21-24/5/2005 52.2 (3) 52.5 (2) 54.0 (1) 48.3 (5) 46.5 (7) 49.0 (4) 47.4 (6) - 45.2 (9) 46.4 (8) 36.3 (10) -
17-20/2/2005 51.4 (2) 49.8 (3) 53.2 (1) 47.2 (5) 46.1 (7) 47.0 (6) 48.6 (4) - 44.0 (9) 46.0 (8) 36.8 (10) -
15-17/11/2004 50.8 (3) 52.1 (2) 54.1 (1) 49.2 (4) 45.0 (9) 49.0 (5) 48.6 (6) - 46.3 (8) 47.6 (7) 37.9 (10) -
21-28/8/2004 49.6 (4) 51.1 (3) 51.8 (1) 48.6 (5) 41.6 (9) 51.2 (2) 48.3 (6) - 44.8 (8) 45.5 (7) 35.9 (10) -
10-13/5/2004 51.6 (5) 53.7 (2) 54.3 (1) 51.8 (4) 42.5 (9) 53.2 (3) 49.9 (6) - 47.4 (8) 48.3 (7) 39.4 (10) -
20-23/2/2004 51.3 (2) 52.3 (1) - 49.0 (6) 42.6 (9) 50.8 (3) 49.7 (5) - 44.9 (8) 47.0 (7) 37.3 (10) 50.6 (4)
15-18/11/2003 50.7 (1) 50.1 (2) - 47.7 (6) 42.1 (8) 49.0 (4) 49.3 (3) - - 45.2 (7) 35.7 (9) 48.4 (5)
18-20/8/2003 49.0 (4) 51.3 (1) - 48.2 (6) 41.2 (9) 50.1 (3) 50.7 (2) - 45.3 (8) 46.0 (7) 35.4 (10) 48.6 (5)
15-20/5/2003 54.1 (2) 54.4 (1) - 52.4 (3) 47.9 (8) 49.8 (6) 49.3 (7) - 47.5 (9) 50.6 (5) 39.1 (10) 52.3 (4)
14-18/2/2003 54.2 (2) 55.5 (1) - 52.1 (4) 49.9 (7) 51.9 (5) 49.3 (8) - 46.5 (9) 50.2 (6) 37.1 (10) 53.9 (3)
1-5/11/2002 - 55.8 (1) - 54.4 (3) 53.3 (4) 51.8 (5) 50.3 (7) - 47.6 (8) 51.3 (6) 37.7 (9) 54.7 (2)
14-19/8/2002 - 56.9 (1) - 54.8 (2) 52.4 (5) 52.5 (4) 51.8 (6) - 49.6 (8) 51.3 (7) 39.5 (9) 53.8 (3)
14-16/5/2002 58.8 (1) 57.9 (2) - 56.0 (3) 55.1 (4) 51.2 (7) 52.5 (6) - 47.9 (9) 50.5 (8) 40.0 (10) 54.0 (5)
18-21/2/2002 57.6 (1) 56.1 (2) - 55.8 (3) 54.0 (4) 50.6 (7) 52.2 (6) - - 50.4 (8) 38.9 (9) 53.1 (5)
15-20/11/2001 57.0 (1) 56.1 (2) - 54.9 (3) 52.7 (5) 51.7 (6) 50.3 (7) - 48.1 (9) 49.3 (8) 38.6 (10) 53.0 (4)
17-24/8/2001 56.7 (1) 55.5 (2) - 52.5 (4) 52.7 (3) 50.7 (6) 48.1 (9) - 48.4 (8) 49.5 (7) 37.7 (10) 51.6 (5)
25-29/5/2001 57.5 (1) 54.6 (2) - 51.9 (4) 52.4 (3) 50.6 (6) 50.2 (7) - 46.2 (9) 50.0 (8) 36.6 (10) 50.7 (5)
19-21/2/2001 60.1 (2) 60.5 (1) - 55.8 (5) 55.5 (6) 57.4 (4) 53.5 (9) - 55.3 (7) 54.4 (8) 46.2 (10) 58.1 (3)
23-27/11/2000 56.4 (1) 55.6 (2) - 52.6 (3) 51.1 (4) 50.5 (6) 48.3 (8) - - 48.4 (7) 37.5 (9) 51.0 (5)
25-30/8/2000 56.1 (1) 52.6 (2) - 50.7 (5) 49.1 (7) 52.5 (3) 47.7 (8) - 49.3 (6) 50.9 (4) - -
2-5/6/2000 58.7 (1) 54.8 (2) - 51.1 (6) 51.9 (5) 52.7 (3) 49.1 (8) - 50.2 (7) 52.3 (4) - -
3/4/2000 55.2 (1) 53.3 (2) - 49.6 (6) 51.1 (5) 52.1 (3) 48.9 (7) - 47.6 (8) 51.6 (4) - -
1-2/2/2000 56.6 (1) 54.5 (2) - 50.0 (4) 50.3 (3) 48.5 (6) 47.7 (7) - 46.7 (8) 48.6 (5) - -
06/12/1999 56.3 (1) 51.1 (2) - 50.0 (4) 50.2 (3) 49.8 (5) 47.3 (8) - 47.6 (7) 47.8 (6) - -
11-16/10/1999 53.1 (1) 51.1 (2) - 45.7 (8) 48.6 (5) 50.4 (3) 47.3 (6) - 48.9 (4) 46.9 (7) - -
02/08/1999 53.2 (1) 51.4 (3) - 48.9 (5) 47.0 (7) 52.0 (2) 47.3 (6) - 49.1 (4) 49.1 (4) - -
Table 8 – Hong Kong People’s Support for the Political Parties, August 1997 to November 2009
Name of 
Political 
Party
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lowing the by-elections, it was reported that central government officials
would meet the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, an umbrella group led by
the Democratic Party. It was subsequently revealed that the latter had in-
dicated to the pro-Beijing united front earlier in December 2009 that it
would be interested in a dialogue with the central government on the po-
litical reform issue. The dialogue surfaced after the Legislative Council by-
elections, and ultimately led to an agreement between the central govern-
ment and the Democratic Party.
The central government accepted the Democratic Party’s proposal that
the five newly-created functional constituency seats for the District
Councils would be voted for by the entire electorate except for those al-
ready enfranchised in the functional constituency elections. In this way,
every voter in Hong Kong would have two votes in the Legislative Council
elections in 2012. According to the Political Reform Proposals of the
HKSAR government released in November 2009, there would be five
more directly-elected Legislative Council seats, one for each of the five
existing geographical constituencies; and five more functional con-
stituency seats to be elected among the District Council members, fol-
lowing the NPCSC stipulation that the two types of constituencies would
remain equal in terms of numbers of seats. In return for the concession,
the Democratic Party Legislators voted in support of the government’s
Political Reform Proposals, which were then endorsed by the legislature.
Due to the change in position of the Democratic Party, the pro-democ-
racy camp lost its veto power in the legislature this time. However, this
veto power is expected to remain effective regarding the democratisation
issue in general.
The voting outcome in the Legislative Council on 24 and 25 June 2010
split the pro-democracy movement. (28) The Democratic Party and its sup-
porters argued that the establishment of a dialogue with the central gov-
ernment following the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was an important
breakthrough, that the concession made by the central government was
significant, and that they would continue to struggle for the ultimate re-
alisation of democracy in the territory. Those who voted against the gov-
ernment’s Political Reform Proposals, including the Civic Party, the LSD, the
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, etc., insisted on a roadmap and
a timetable, and considered the so-called “concession” by the central gov-
ernment to have increased both the number and the legitimacy of func-
tional constituencies. There was also suspicion that the Democratic Party
had refused to support the “pseudo-referendum” earlier because it had
wanted to establish trust with the Chinese authorities to facilitate negoti-
ations on political reform. 
The chasm between the radical and conservative wings of the pro-
democracy movement is now very clear. Since the Chinese authorities
have no intention of allowing genuine democracy in the territory in the
near future, there is no chance for the pro-democracy groups to form a
government. Further, as indicated above, they have almost no influence on
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28. See all major newspapers of Hong Kong on 24 and 25 June 2010.
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Date
of Survey
FTU HKCTU CivicParty ADPL DAB DP LP LSD
HKAS
PDMC Frontier AFA NWS
01/06/1999 56.8 (1) 55.2 (2) - 49.8 (7) 51.9 (3) 51.6 (4) 49.0 (8) - 51.3 (5) 50.8 (6) - -
09/04/1999 55.8 (1) - - 49.9 (5) 51.3 (4) 55.5 (2) 48.9 (7) - 49.7 (6) 51.4 (3) - -
01/02/1999 58.5 (1) - - 52.6 (5) 53.7 (4) 54.7 (2) 50.9 (7) - 51.1 (6) 54.0 (3) - -
1-2/12/1998 57.5 (1) - - 50.8 (6) 52.4 (4) 55.9 (2) 51.1 (5) - 50.5 (7) 52.5 (3) - -
09/10/1998 56.4 (1) - - 50.8 (5) 49.9 (6) 55.6 (2) 48.2 (7) - 50.9 (4) 53.7 (3) - -
04/08/1998 57.7 (1) - - 51.6 (6) 52.6 (4) 57.5 (2) 51.3 (7) - 52.2 (5) 54.9 (3) - -
3-4/6/1998 57.9 (2) - - - 52.7 (4) 60.1 (1) 49.5 (5) - - 57.7 (3) - -
07/04/1998 58.7 (2) - - 54.6 (3) 54.4 (4) 59.0 (1) 53.0 (5) - - - - -
2-3/2/1998 58.5 (1) - - 53.1 (4) 54.0 (3) 57.9 (2) 51.9 (5) - - - - -
2-3/12/1997 60.1 (1) - - - 53.7 (4) 58.5 (2) 50.1 (5) - 53.8 (3) - - -
3-4/10/1997 56.3 (1) - - - 49.7 (4) 55.5 (2) 48.0 (5) - 50.7 (3) - - -
06/08/1997 61.4 (2) - - - 57.2 (4) 63.8 (1) 56.0 (5) - 59.9 (3) - - -
Notes: 
1. FTU = The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions;
HKCTU = Hong Kong Confederation Trade Unions;
ADPL = Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood;
DAB = Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong;
DP = The Democratic Party;
LP = Liberal Party;
LSD = League of Social Democrats;
HKASPDMC = Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China;
AFA = April Fifth Action;
NWS = Neighbourhood & Worker’s Service Centre 
2. The Civic Party was established in March 2006; the data for the Article 45 Concern Group were used from May 2004 to February 2006. The League of Social Democrats was formed in October 2006. The Frontier
(a pro-democracy political group) merged with the Democratic Party in December 2008. 
3. The question in each survey was: Please use a scale of 0-100 to rate your extent of support to XXX, with 0 indicating absolutely not supportive, 100 indicating absolutely supportive and 50 indicating half-half.
How would you rate XXX?
4. The numbers in brackets indicate ranking in each of the surveys.
Source: Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong, “POP Polls: Rating of Top Ten Political Groups,” from http:// http://hkupop.hku.hk.
Name of 
Political 
Party
Article
Date of Survey
Pro-Democracy Legislator
As the Most Popular 
Legislator Among 
All 60 Legislators
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislator Among the Top
Three most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislator Among the 
Top Five most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislators Among the 
Top Ten most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
18-21/1/2010 Yes 3 5 8
15-19/10/2009 Yes 2 3 8
14-18/7/2009 Yes 2 4 7
21-23/4/2009 Yes 2 4 8
19-21/1/2009 Yes 3 4 8
22-24/10/2008 Yes 3 4 7
9-10/7/2008 No 2 3 6
16-18/4/2008 No 2 2 6
16-18/1/2008 No 1 2 6
22-25/10/2007 No 2 2 6
23-26/7/2007 No 1 2 6
17-20/4/2007 No 2 2 7
22-26/1/2007 No 1 2 6
23-27/10/2006 No 1 2 6
14-21/7/2006 No 1 2 6
18-21/4/2006 No 1 2 6
16-20/1/2006 No 1 1 6
9-13/11/2005 No 1 2 6
5-9/8/2005 No 0 2 6
9-12/5/2005 No 1 2 6
14-16/2/2005 No 1 2 6
8-11/11/2004 Yes 1 1 5
9-16/8/2004 Yes 1 2 6
3-7/5/2004 Yes 1 2 6
9-14/2/2004 Yes 1 2 5
10-12/11/2003 Yes 1 2 6
11-12/8/2003 Yes 1 2 5
2-7/5/2003 No 1 2 5
4-7/2/2003 No 0 2 4
1-5/11/2002 Yes 2 3 5
2-7/8/2002 Yes 1 3 5
2-7/5/2002 No 1 2 5
4-6/2/2002 Yes 2 2 5
1-5/11/2001 Yes 2 2 5
1-3/8/2001 Yes 2 3 6
19-23/5/2001 No 2 2 5
5-13/2/2001 No 2 3 5
14-16/11/2000 No 2 2 5
8-12/8/2000 Yes 3 4 6
26-30/5/2000 Yes 3 4 6
13/03/2000 Yes 3 4 6
21-24/1/2000 No 1 2 4
24/11/1999 Yes 2 2 5
Table 9 – Popularity Ranking of the Pro-democracy Legislators, February 1997 to October 2009
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the government’s policy-making process. Under the circumstances, unity
and discipline have decreasing appeal to politicians in the pro-democracy
camp. Moreover, the multi-member, single-vote geographical constituen-
cies in the Legislative Council elections exacerbate splittism. In the largest
constituency, i.e., New Territories West, which returns eight legislators, a
candidate can secure a seat with 8 to 9 percent of the votes cast. Hence,
with the usual voter turnout rate at around 50 percent, a candidate can
theoretically win a seat with the support of 4 or 5 percent of the con-
stituency, as long as supporters can be motivated to come out and vote.
Moving towards a more radical position may contribute to a sharp image
appealing to a sufficient minority of the electorate. The LSD apparently has
been very successful in following this type of strategy; it certainly has been
attracting a lot of media attention. At the other end of the pro-democracy
political spectrum, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s
Livelihood avoids controversial political issues and concentrates on district
work in Sham Shui Po. Their different orientations make solidarity within
the pro-democracy camp more problematic.
There are other types of problems as well. The frustrations of many
“young Turks” in the radical wing of the pro-democracy movement are re-
lated to bottlenecks in their political careers. The two municipal councils
were abolished in 2000, and there are very limited chances of getting
elected to the Legislative Council as the “old guards” hold on to their seats.
Junior politicians therefore spend many years on the District Councils,
where remuneration is insufficient to support full-time political careers. 
These inter-party and intra-party differences within the pro-democracy
movement became public over the “pseudo-referendum” issue. Mutual re-
criminations damaged the image of the entire pro-democracy movement
while also discouraging its supporters. Worse still, the two founding elders
of the DP, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, had opposing views on the “pseudo-
referendum.” Szeto openly criticised Lee for his political immaturity, and
accused youthful supporters of the “pseudo-referendum” of actually help-
ing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (29)
When the pro-democracy movement organised a rally protesting against
the Political Reform Proposals on New Year’s Day 2010, the turnout was
not expected to be impressive, with a general estimate that around 10,000
people would take part. The turnout actually reached 30,000, due in part
to the heavy sentence imposed on Liu Xiaobo. (30) Another surprise was the
enthusiastic opposition to the HKSAR government’s costly plan for a high-
speed railway from Kowloon linking to the high-speed railway system on
the mainland. The opposition came from young people referred to as the
“post-80s generation,” who exhibit strong dissatisfaction with the estab-
lishment but have little respect and trust for the pro-democracy political
parties. (31) There was also an unexpectedly high turnout of about
150,000 (32) for the June 4 anniversary candlelight vigil in 2010, with many
young people in attendance. The commemoration events in 2011 was sim-
ilar; the organizers claimed that more than 150,000 people participated.
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29. See, for example, Ming Pao, 25 November 2009 and 14 December 2009; Oriental Daily News, 25 No-
vember 2009 and 29 November 2009; and Hong Kong Economic Journal, 14 December 2009.
30. See all major Hong Kong newspapers on 2 January 2010.
31. See all major Hong Kong newspapers on 9 January 9 2010.
32. According to the figures announced by Szeto Wah, Chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance, which organ-
ised the event. Different figures were claimed by different parties nonetheless. 
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Date of Survey
Pro-Democracy Legislator
As the Most Popular 
Legislator Among 
All 60 Legislators
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislator Among the Top
Three most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislator Among the 
Top Five most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
No. of Pro-Democracy 
Legislators Among the 
Top Ten most Popular 
Legislators in the entire
Legislature
27/09/1999 Yes 2 4 7
26/07/1999 Yes 2 3 6
24/05/1999 Yes 3 3 6
25/03/1999 Yes 3 5 6
26/01/1999 Yes 3 5 6
25/11/1998 Yes 3 5 6
23-24/9/1998 Yes 3 5 6
28/07/1998 Yes 3 5 6
24/03/1998 Yes 1 1 1
23/01/1998 No 1 1 1
24-25/11/1997 No 1 1 1
15-18/9/1997 No 0 0 0
22/07/1997 No 1 1 1
5-6/6/1997 Yes 3 5 7
19-20/5/1997 No 1 1 1
10-15/4/1997 Yes 3 5 7
17-18/3/1997 No 1 1 1
3-4/2/1997 Yes 3 5 6
Source: Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong, “POP Polls: Rating of Top Ten Legislative Councillors,” from http://hkupop.hku.hk.
The frustrations and dissatisfaction of the “post-80s generation” have at-
tracted a lot of attention, (33) highlighting the exacerbating problems of
widening income disparity, declining opportunities for upward social mo-
bility among young people, and a perception of worsening social injustice
as government policies are seen to favour major business groups. These
problems certainly erode the legitimacy of the HKSAR government, espe-
cially when the related grievances are sharply articulated by activists of
the “post-80s generation.”
The expectations of the younger generation reflect the community’s
changing values and demands, and members of the “post-80s generation”
probably consider both the government and the pro-democracy parties to
have failed them. While the Tung and Tsang administrations have been
lacklustre at best in their socio-economic policy programmes, the pro-
democracy movement also feels the pressure of the perception that its
concentration on political reform issues is inadequate and cannot attract
the sustained support of the majority of the population.
Conclusion
Most Hong Kong people understand that Chinese leaders have no inten-
tion of allowing genuine democracy in the territory, but they are unwilling
to confront the Chinese authorities and are reluctant to sacrifice for the
cause of democracy because the status quo is tolerable. Political apathy
and the sense of political impotence in the community have therefore
been growing in recent years. The pro-democracy movement finds it in-
creasingly difficult to mobilise the people, and frustration over the lack of
progress has exacerbated and publicised internal division. A major break-
through in the foreseeable future seems unlikely, while maintaining the
momentum of the movement has become a daunting challenge. These
pressures, along with the resourcefulness and effectiveness of the pro-
Beijing united front electoral machinery, were keenly felt when many
leaders of the pro-democracy movement appealed for caution and avoid-
ance of risk in deciding against support for the “pseudo-referendum” pro-
posal.
The difficulties of the pro-democracy movement have nevertheless not
translated into advantages for the Tsang administration. Even the pro-Bei-
jing united front is unhappy with the HKSAR government’s performance,
and blames its incompetence for the absence of an economic develop-
ment strategy that would revive the territory’s international competitive-
ness and relieve social polarisation. The Chinese leadership’s hard-line po-
sition on political reform has exacerbated the legitimacy deficit of the
Tsang administration, which is perceived by people on both sides of the
HKSAR border as dependent on support from the Chinese authorities.
Tsang’s position has probably been salvaged by the fact that the Chinese
leadership can hardly afford another forced resignation of a Chief Execu-
tive handpicked by Beijing.
Although Hong Kong people’s confidence in China and their trust in the
Chinese leadership as well as their identification with the mainland have
been growing since the territory’s return to China, the Chinese govern-
ment’s strong backing of the HKSAR has become a double-edged sword.
Hong Kong people realise that decisions on local political reform are made
in Beijing, and they also partly blame the Chinese authorities for the un-
satisfactory performance of the HKSAR government, which is chosen by
and accountable to Beijing.
The lose-lose situation can only be reversed by the Chinese leadership
becoming enlightened and secure enough to allow genuine democracy in
the territory. This is unlikely, however, as today’s Chinese leaders still can-
not accept erosion of the CCP’s monopoly on political power, and the for-
mula for political stability in China remains economic growth and an ab-
sence of democracy.
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33. See Michael E. DeGolyez, Protest and Post-80s Youth, A Special Report on the Post-1980 Generation
in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Transition Project, Hong Kong Baptist University, 2010. The Central Policy
Unit of the HKSAR government and the Applied Socio-Economic Research Centre of the Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology jointly organised a seminar on “Youth and Social Change” on 17
December 2010 to examine the issues of the territory’s “post-80s generation”; the papers are available
at http://www.cpu.gov.hk/txttc/conference 20101217.htm.
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